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psychiatric personnel, were able to provide help and support to the mother.9 4
If two physicians felt the woman could not handle her pregnancy, physically
or psychically, an abortion was granted. One prerequisite for an abortion
based on nonphysical reasons was that the woman must be given information
on the help and support that would be available to her during pregnancy and
after childbirth 5 The important aspects of the program is that it recognizes
the social, economic, or personal reasons for desiring an abortion; and it
tries to solve these problems so as to motivate the woman not to abort.9 6
It is a far more successful and constructive means of prevention than is punishment. Such an approach helps the mother adjust to the physiological and
emotional changes that are a normal occurrence during the first months of
pregnancy.
CONCLUSION

The ultimate means of preventing abortions is increased sex education,
particularly in the field of contraception. But since contraceptive techniques
are not completely perfected, society is faced with the abortion question.
Society must then decide if, in fact, forced parenthood is within its best
interests or those of the child or parents. In view of the reluctance of state
legislatures to handle this question, advocates of abortion reform will now
turn to the courts for protection of their constitutional rights.
KATHRYN L. POWERS

AIRCRAFT HIJACKING: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL ASPECTS
"Will I reach my destination?" Because of the increasing number of aircraft hijackings, this question is on the minds of a substantial number of
those who travel by air. Luckily, to date, unlawful seizure of aircraft by
persons demanding to go to Cuba has not resulted in a major aircraft tragedy.
The odds that sooner or later this good fortune will cease appear probable,
and the menace to the integrity of our airways will then become all too real.
For purposes of analyzing the problem of aircraft hijacking, this note
discusses separately the criminal and civil aspects of the problem. The
applicable criminal law, methods of preventing and detecting potential
hijackers, and issues of venue and jurisdiction are discussed in Part I. Part II
addresses itself primarily to the civil liability of the airline to the passengers
on board a hijacked aircraft, and considers such issues as choice of law, relative
international agreements, and possible theories of recovery, including applicable tariffs.
94.
95.
96.

D. SMITH, supra note 84, at 150-51.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 165.
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PART I:

CRIMINAL ASPECTS

Hijacking an aircraft in flight may subject the offender to criminal prosecution and conviction under both federal and state law.' Sanctioned conduct
may be directed against the aircraft itself, the personnel, or passengers on
board. Applicable state laws, the authority of the federal government to
legislate, federal ancillary offenses, the need for a specific hijacking statute,
and discussion of the 1961 Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, including
its proposed strengthening, are noted in Section A. Obtaining personal jurisdiction over hijackers by means of extradition is also briefly touched upon
under this first section.
Section B analyzes means used in addition to criminal sanctions to meet
the demands of the current hijacking crisis. The airlines have responded by
according widespread publicity of the punishment received for conviction
of hijacking and related offenses, studying the personality characteristics of
potential offenders, and developing arms-detection devices in an effort to
prevent likely hijackers from boarding their aircraft. Further discussion in
this section is directed to the right to search passengers and the legal consequences incident thereto, in addition to possible solution of the problem by
lifting the qualified travel ban to Cuba.
The 1961 Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act appears to extend
United States jurisdiction over offenses committed on board aircraft far
beyond the permissible bounds of international law. Section C briefly notes
the issue of venue relevant to prosecuting hijackers and discusses at length
the international basis upon which the United States can obtain jurisdiction
pursuant to the 1961 Amendment.
A. The Criminal Consequences of Aircraft Hijacking
Florida, like its sister states, has no legislation directed toward aircraft
hijacking per se.2 Florida has laws, however, encompassing such offenses as
aircraft larceny, 3 shooting at or within aircraft,4 causing death resulting from
tampering with aircraft,5 and for numerous other offenses committed in or
against aircraft while in flight or on the ground within the state boundaries.6
In effect, the entire criminal code of Florida is applicable to offenses committed aboard aircraft so long as they occur within the territorial boundaries
1. Accord, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
519 (1952), rehearingdenied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).
F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1959). See also text accompanying
2. A search of appropriate sources has revealed

187 (1959); Frisbie v. Collins,

342 U.S.

See generally Clark v. United States, 267
note 3 infra.

no specific state legislation on the matter.

Bradford, The Legal Ramifications of Hijacking Airplanes, 48 A.BAJ. 1034 (1962).

3. FiA. STAT. §811.021 (1967); see Fla. H.R. 372, Reg. Sess. (1969), making the breaking
and entering of an aircraft a crime. The bill was not voted upon during the 1969 session
and has been prefiled for the 1970 session.
4. FA. STAT. §790.19 (1967).
5. FIA. STAT. §782.06 (1967).
6. FLA. STAT. §910.02 (1967); see Brown, Jurisdiction of United States Courts Over

Crimes in Aircraft, 15 STAN. L. REv. 45 (1962).
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of, or airspace above, the state. 7 The extraterritorial jurisdiction s of the
state might allow prosecution of an aircraft hijacker for kidnapping 9 even
if the aircraft were seized out of the state but passed through Florida's airspace enroute to the hijacker's destination. Although the hijacker's motive
for seizing the plane may be nonpecuniary, he can nevertheless be prosecuted
for kidnapping10
The federal government derives its authority to legislate concerning the
airspace above the United States from either of two sources: sovereignty and
the power incident thereto, limited only by international law; and specific
grants in the United States Constitution."

There is ample authority to

support either theory,' 2 and regardless of which is relied upon it is well
established that the federal government shares concurrent jurisdiction in this
area with each of the states. 13
Aside from the specific offense of hijacking,14 the hijacker subjects himself to prosecution for a variety of ancillary federal offenses that are determined by the method employed to consummate the unlawful act. Offenders
have often threatened to discharge explosives in order to coerce the pilot to
alter his flight plan. The offender may or may not have had the means to carry
out his threats; nonetheless such utterances are a violation of the "Bomb
Hoax" statute.15 In addition, the unlawful expropriation of the aircraft for his
7. Because federal courts have no common law criminal jurisdiction, to confer jurisdiction on federal courts federal legislation must specifically enumerate which acts are offenses
aboard aircraft. Bray v. United States, 289 F. 329 (4th Cir. 1923).
8. FLA. STAT. §910.01 (1967): "When the commission of an offense committed elsewhere
is consummated within the boundaries of this state, the offender shall be liable to punishment here, though he was out of the state at the commission of the offense charged, if he
consummated it in this state through the intervention of an innocent or guilty agent, or by
any other means proceeding directly from himself. The jurisdiction in such case, unless
otherwise provided by law, shall be in the county in which the offense was consummated."
See generally Comment, Criminal Law: Personal Jurisdiction Obtained by Kidnapping, 5
U. FLA. L. REv. 434 (1952).
9. FLA. STAT. §805.01 (1967).
10. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75 (1964); accord, e.g., Epperson v. State, 211 Ind.
237, 6 N.E.2d 538 (1937).
11. See Brown, note 6 supra; Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction,6 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 32 (1967). See also RESTATEMtENT (SEcOND)
OF FOPEIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §16 (1965).
12. See Brown, note 6 supra; Empson, note 11 supra; Convention on International Civil
Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1944): Article I, "The contracting states recognize that every state
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."; 49 U.S.C.
§1508 (a) (1964). "The United States of America is declared to possess and exercise complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in the airspace of the United States .... ... See also
H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1961). "Nothing in this legislation is to be
taken to indicate that the United States is surrendering any part of its sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory." But see Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 597 (1954).
13. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590,
597 (1954); see H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th CONG., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
14. 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i) (1964).
15. 18 U.S.C. §35 (1964); see Carlson v. United States, 296 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1961);
Criminal Law-Aviation-Bomb Hoax, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 390 (1964); See generally 18 U.S.C.
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personal use further subjects the offender to prosecution. 16 Most apparent ot
17
the ancillary crimes that a hijacker commits is kidnapping.
The need for federal legislation dealing specifically with hijacking and
other criminal acts committed aboard aircraft in flight is evidenced by the
difficulties of prosecution encountered under existing state law.18 As one
commentator has noted:' 9
[T]he State above which the crime may have been committed is often
not the State in which the aircraft lands. The second State has no
jurisdiction over the crime and cannot even arrest the criminal when
the crime was completed in the first State. If the first State is disposed
to act, it has first to collect the evidence that a crime has in fact been
committed within its State jurisdiction. All the evidence of this went
with the aircraft to the State of the landing. The witnesses would have
dispersed soon after landing. Assuming that an indictment may be
returned in the first State, the question of extradition from the [landing state to the overflown state] remains. Not all crimes are extraditable: Time and expense are involved, and litigation is frequently
necessary.
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was amended in order to solve the
"jurisdictional problems involved in fixing a locus for a crime committed
in transit and in arresting a deplaning passenger who may have engaged in
criminal activity over the territory of a different State." 20 The amendment
does not divest the states of jurisdiction; it merely seeks to establish concurrent jurisdiction, thus affording a greater likelihood of arrest and
prosecution of those accused of committing offenses aboard aircraft. 2' By
amending the Act Congress sought to make criminal certain acts committed
aboard aircraft in flight in air commerce. These acts had formerly been federal
offenses only when occurring within the special maritime and territorial

§34 (1964); 15 U.S.C. §1281 (1964).
16. 18 U.S.C. §2312 (1964); see Stewart v. United States, 395 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1968)
(defendant was convicted of transporting a stolen airplane in interstate commerce after
leasing the aircraft in Florida and fraudulently flying it to Iowa without the permission of
the lessor). Contra, McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (held airplane not included
under statute that forbids interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles). See generally
Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1967); 18 U.S.C. §659 (1964) (interstate or
foreign shipments by carrier; state prosecutions).
17. 18 U.S.C. §1201 (1964). See 18 U.S.C. §3237 (1964) (offenses begun in one district
and completed in another); Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631 (1961); Clinton v. United
States, 293 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1961). See generally Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th
Cir. 1968); 18 U.S.C.A. §3235 (1964) (venue in capital cases).
18. H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1961).
19. Bradford, supra note 2, at 1034.
20. United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 85 (1964).
21. H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961), repeatedly emphasizes that Congress by no means wishes to exert exclusive jurisdiction in this area, but desires simply to
supplement existing state law in an effort to increase the deterrent for such offenses. Moreover, the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1472(n) (1964), as amended, authorizes the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate offenses enumerated.
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jurisdiction of the United States.2 2 The prohibited acts are: assault, 23 maiming,24 larceny,25 receiving stolen goods,26 murder,2 manslaughter,2s attempt

to commit murder or manslaughter 2 9 rape, 30 carnal knowledge of female
under sixteen, 31 and robbery. 32 The 1961 Amendment also makes criminal
interference with members of the flight crew or flight attendants33 carrying
concealed weapons aboard aircraft, : 4 and conveying false information con-

22. 49 U.S.C. §1472(k)(1) (1964) provides that: "Whoever, while aboard an aircraft in
flight in air commerce, commits an act which, if committed within the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, as defined in section 7 or title 18, would
be in violation of section 113, 114, 661, 662, 1111, 1112, 1113, 2031, 2032, or 2111 of such
title 18 shall be punished as provided therein. (2) Whoever, while aboard an aircraft in
flight in air commerce commits an act, which if committed in the District of Columbia
would be in violation of section 9 of the Act entitled 'An Act for the preservation of the
public peace and the protection of property within the District of Columbia,' approved July
29, 1892, as amended (D.C. Code, sec. 22-1112), shall be punished as provided therein."
See H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 11 (1961). The Senate bill was passed in
lieu of the House bill after substituting for its language the text of the House bill.
23. 18 U.S.C. §113 (1964). See generally United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893);
Nixon v. United States, 352 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1965); Bray v. United States, 289 F. 329 (4th
Cir. 1923).
24. 18 U.S.C. §114 (1964).
25. 18 U.S.C. §661 (1964); see Clark v. United States, 267 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1959).
26. 18 U.S.C. §662 (1964).
27. 18 U.S.C. §1111 (1964). See generally United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
412 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820); Nixon v. United
States, 352 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1965); Hackathron v. Decker, 243 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
28. 18 U.S.C. §1112 (1964). See generally United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76 (1820).
29. 18 U.S.C. §1113 (1964).
30. 18 U.S.C. §2031 (1964).
31.
18 U.S.C. §2032 (1964).
32. 10 U.S.C. §2111 (1964). See also United States v. Palmer, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 610, 626,
630 (1816). (Formerly, a robbery committed upon the high seas was piracy giving the
circuit courts jurisdiction thereof).
33. 49 U.S.C. §1472 () (1964): "Whoever, while aboard an aircraft in flight in air
commerce, assaults, intimidates, or threatens any flight crew member or flight attendant
(including any steward or stewardess) of such aircraft, so as to interfere with the performance by such member or attendant of his duties or lessen the ability of such member
or attendant to perform his duties, shall be fined not more than $I0,000 or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly
or dangerous weapon shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life." In Mims v.
United States, 332 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964), defendant
was convicted of interfering with the pilot of the private airplane in which he was a
passenger while said pilot was attempting to land the aircraft. In confirming the conviction, the court held that the pilot was included within the definition of "flight crew" and
that the indictment need not specify the "particular overt acts employed to consummate the
offense." Id. at 946. See also 18 U.S.C. §1364 (1964) (interference with foreign commerce
by violence).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 1472() (1964): "Except for law enforcement officers of any municipal or
State government, or the Federal Government, who are authorized or required to carry arms,
and except for such other persons as may be so authorized tinder regulations issued by the
Administrator, whoever, while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air
transportation, has on or about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon . . .
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cerning attempts or alleged attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in the statute.35 Congress, in addition to the above, created and defined
the separate offense of aircraft piracy: 8
(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit aircraft piracy, as
herein defined, shall be punished - (a) by death if the verdict of the
jury shall so recommend, or, in the case of a plea of guilty, or a plea
of not guilty where the defendant has waived a trial by jury, if the
court in its discretion shall so order; or (b) by imprisonment for not
less than twenty years, if the death penalty is not imposed.
(2) As used in this subsection, the term "aircraft piracy" means
any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force
or violence and with wrongful intent, of an aircraft in flight in air
commerce.
Congress specifically declined to draw the analogy between the offenses of
aircraft piracy and piracy on the high seas: "There is no intention . . . that
the meaning and interpretation of this subsection shall be influenced in any
way by precedent or interpretations relating to 'piracy on the high seas.' ,7
Congress had recently ratified the Convention on the High Seas, which
identically defines maritime and aircraft piracy, but Congress apparently
felt at liberty to disregard the Convention in drafting the hijacking statute
because the Convention had not then become effective.38
shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." (Noteworthy is the fact that Congress exempted private planes under this subsection. This subsection alone gives jurisdiction to federal courts whether the plane is in flight or on the
ground.)
35. 49 U.S.C. §1472(m),(1) (1964): "Whoever imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the information to be false, concerning an
attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which would be a
crime prohibited by subsection (i), (j), (k), or () of this section, shall be fined not more
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (2) Whoever willfully and
malidously, or with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, imparts or conveys or
causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the information to be false,
concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which
would be a crime prohibited by subsection (i), (j), (k), or () of this section, shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." See also note
15 supra (the "Bomb Hoax" statute is nearly identical in wording to this subsection).
36. 49 U.S.C. §1472 (i) (1964).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 958, Ist Sess., 87th Cong. 8, 9 (1961). The report indicates that
the definition of piracy under international law was too uncertain to incorporate airplane
hijacking under the present piracy statute. 18 U.S.C. §1651 (1964).
38. H.R. REP. No. 958, 1st Sess. 87th Cong. 9 (1961). See Convention on the High Seas
formulated at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held in Geneva in
1958, as recorded in 106 CONG. Rac. 11177-80 (1960). Article 15: "Piracy consists of any
of the following acts: (1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship/or aircraft. (b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or
property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (2) Any act of voluntary participation on the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it
a pirate ship or aircraft; (3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 2 of this article."
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United States v. Healy3 9 is the only reported case dealing specifically with

"aircraft piracy."

The District Court for the Southern District of Florida
charging the defendant with aircraft piracy and
the
indictment
dismissed
kidnapping. Addressing itself to the count alleging aircraft piracy, the court
reasoned that the statute was limited in its application to commercial aircraft. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions, holding
that "air commerce," as defined by the statute, most definitely included private
aircraft.
Unfortunately, successful prosecution of aircraft offenders is rare, since
most hijackers remain in Cuba beyond the sanctions of our federal and state
courts. The hijacker is often in flight to avoid prosecution by either state or
federal authorities.40 By fleeing, the offender tolls the federal statute of
limitations for the offense from which he flees4I and also for the offenses
committed aboard the aircraft utilized for his escape. 42 There is no statute of
3
limitations for the offense of aircraft piracy.
The need for an effective deterrent to aircraft hijacking has led to a
proposed strengthening of the 1961 Amendment. A bill designed "to deter
the hijacking of commercial aircraft of United States registry" has been introduced in the House of Representatives.44 The bill is divided into three parts.
The first part deals with protections to the plane and its crew and passengers
during the hijacking. The proposed statute provides: 5
(a) that each member of the flight crew may carry a firearm. The
weapon may not be taken from the flight deck during aircraft operation
except with permission of the pilot (it has been suggested that armed
guards should be provided, however this would not only be expensive
but would invite a gunfight, which at 30,000 in a pressurized cabin is a
sure route to disaster) ;
(b) that the flight deck door be bulletproof;
39. 376 U.S. 75 (1964).
40. See 18 U.S.C. §1073 (1964). Flight to avoid prosecution in interstate or foreign commerce is a federal offense in itself punishable by a fine of $5,000 or imprisonment not more
than five years, or both. E.g., Hett v. United States, 353 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 905 (1966). In affirming the conviction of a Seattle attorney for aiding and abetting
a robber's flight to Brazil to avoid prosecution, the court stated that one may be guilty
of fleeing from prosecution in state one, a place from which he has already left, by moving
from state two to state three. The court refused to discuss the question of how many offenses
are committed under §1073 when a nonstop flight crosses several state lines. See United
States v. Brandenburg, 144 F.2d 656 (3d Cir. 1944).
41. 18 U.S.C. §3290 (1964); McGowen v. United States, 105 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
Once a person becomes a fugitive from justice, the statute of limitations will no longer run
so as to eventually grant him immunity. Contra, United States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613
(2d Cir. 1950).
42. See 18 U.S.C. §3282 (1964) (5-year statute of limitations on noncapital federal

offense).
43. 18 U.S.C. §3281 (1964).
44. H.R. REP. No. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (presently before the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce); see note 100 infra. The jurisdictional question concerning American registered aircraft appears reasonably settled.
45. H.R. REP. No. 721, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
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(c) that the lock on the flight deck door be unlockable only from the
flight deck;
(d) that the aircraft be constructed so as to permit continuous
observation of the passengers from the flight deck and that there be voice
communication, with them;
(e) that a warning device be attached to the flight deck door indicating when someone is trying to unlock it from the outside; and
(f) that no unauthorized person shall be permitted on the flight deck
while the aircraft is in operation.
The second part of the proposed legislation, more preventive in .nature,
would make it unlawful to carry an undeclared firearm, explosive substance,
or tear gas on board the aircraft. A violation of an offense enumerated in
this part would carry a maximum punishment of a 10,000 dollar fine or
ten years in prison or both. Part two of the bill further provides that "it
shall be unnecessary to prove intent to harm either the aircraft, its crew, or
passengers therein, and the offense proscribed by this section shall be estab46
lished by proof of the commission of the act prohibited, regardless of intent."
This part of the proposed legislation, if once passed and given widespread
publicity in the form of posters at boarding sites or in air terminals, could
play a significant role in deterring those individuals carrying such arms aboard
and contemplating a hijacking.
The third part of this bill offers a reward of 30,000 dollars for the return
"to the United States of any and each person subsequently finally convicted
of the capital offense of hijacking any commercial aircraft of United States
registry wherever in the world such aircraft may have been operating at the
time of such offense."4 7 At present the Air Transport Association and the Air
Line Pilots Association are offering a reward of 25,000 dollars for information
leading to the arrest and conviction of hijackers. In order to continue to
insure safety in flight, the reward will not be available for apprehension of a
48
hijacker in flight.
The proposed strengthening of the 1961 amendment would in certain
respects make convictions easier to obtain. Nevertheless, to be an effective
deterrent, criminal sanctions must pose a present threat to those contemplating offenses. Without personal jurisdiction over the offender, the deterrent function of the criminal law is mitigated, if not completely abrogated.
Return of hijackers by the Cuban government to the United States would
give our courts the needed personal jurisdiction for prosecution. As extradition is governed exclusively by treaty in the United States,4 9 it would seem
expedient that such a treaty as was called for in a Senate resolution be signed
with Cuba. The resolution suggested that the Organization of American
States immediately begin consultations on hijacking in order: 50
46. Id. at 3.
47.
48.
before
49.
50.

Id. at 4.
Statement by Stuart G. Tipton, President, Air Transport Association of America,
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Comm., Feb. 6, 1969 (unpublished).
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
S. Res. 100, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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(1) to draw a treaty obligating all members to protect aircraft
passengers and airplanes hijacked to their country, and furthermore
agreeing to arrest all hijackers and arrange for their immediate return
to the nation of their origin for legal prosecution, and
(2) to arrange for the submission of the treaty to Cuba.
The House of Representatives has passed a similar resolution. 51
Extradition of the hijacker to the United States would benefit both the
United States and Cuba. A review of the characteristics of the more recent
hijackers shows that they are not the kind of people the Cuban government
or any other government would want to keep. Furthermore, there is some
indication that hijackers are not finding Cuba the haven they thought it
52
would be; in fact, several have been mistreated and have subsequently left.
By extraditing the hijacker from Cuba, he is brought to justice in the jurisdiction whose laws have been primarily offended by the alleged conduct.
Successful extradition would promote "both international relations and an
understanding of foreign criminal objectives." 53 Until this happens, however,
the emphasis must be concentrated on apprehending potential offenders prior
to their disembarkment rather than increasing criminal sanctions to which
an offender would be subject following his arrest.
B. Prevention and Deterrence
The high incidence of hijackings in 1968,54 which has continued into
1969,55

has caused not only the airlines but several federal agencies and

private associations56 as well as the United States Congress 57 to seek a way
to prevent future hijackings. The following is an examination of some of
the proposed preventive measures.
51. H. Res. 218, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
52. Dr. John Dailey, chief of the psychology staff of the Federal Aviation Administration, recently commented that there has been a sharp drop in the number of hijackings
since a story concerning one of them was released. It related how the hijacker was held
in solitary confinement and denied cigarettes by Cuban authorities, LIFE, April 18, 1969,
at 27.
53. Comment, Extradition: Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Uncertainty of Prosecution in the Requested Nation, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1181 (1968).
54. There were 28 hijackings in 1968. Department of State listing, Hijackings of Planes
to Cuba and Frustrated Attempts to Hijack (Dec. 10, 1968).
55. As of June 25, 1969, there have been 19 hijackings in 1969. See Palm Beach Post,
June 25, 1969, at 1.
56. The Federal Aviation Administration, the International Air Transport Association,
the Air Transport Association, the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations,
and the AFL-CIO Executive Council have all issued statements suggesting possible solutions.
57. See S. Res. 100, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). "The provisions of this legislation
[1961 Amendment] it will be noted, are based on the use of criminal sanctions as a deterrent to the commission of criminal acts. In the course of the hearings there were many
references to other possible methods of dealing with the present situation, such as, for
example, authorizing flight crew members to carry arms, locking cockpit doors, searching
passengers for concealed firearms as they enter airplanes, and so on." H.R. REP. No. 968
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
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Most airlines have begun displaying at their boarding gates posters appraising the public that aircraft piracy is a federal crime, for which an
offender can receive the death penalty or a mandatory twenty-year prison
sentence. 8 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) believes knowledge
of the severe penalties will deter some of those considering a hijacking or
related offense. To achieve public awareness, the FAA is adopting the following measures: wide publicity of the severe penalties for both hijacking and
carrying a concealed weapon on board aircraft; and the posting of signs and
printed cards in all airport terminals and at boarding gates warning passengers that persons and baggage are subject to electronic or physical search for
weapons. 59 This publicity may discourage some potential offenders, as many
0
are unsure of themselves.A
The hijackers plaguing domestic and international carriers have been
an odd lot. Many of those forcing planes to Cuba have been afflicted with
mental disorders. One hijacker believed himself to be a reincarnated pirate
from the Spanish Main. "Psychopaths, fugitives from justice, disturbed hippies, unbalanced political extremists, losers, ex-convicts, juvenile delinquents
and mystery men fleeing from we know not what - these are the hijackers
who take U. S. planes to Cuba."'61 The difficulties of using publicity to dissuade unstable persons from hijacking are overwhelming. However, an FAA
task force recently announced its studies of characteristics of hijackers reveal
62
that only one per cent of air travelers need screening.
Beyond a mere poster at the boarding areas, several airlines are working on
detection devices. One airline has indicated that it is working to perfect
such devices, but feels for security purposes that the public should not be
aware of their nature.63 Another airline currently employs an electronic
device designed to detect the presence of metallic articles on the person or in
the passenger's luggage.64 This carrier has cooperated with the FAA in testing
new devices because it has been one of the most frequently plagued by
hijackings. The FAA is currently evaluating various techniques for such
detection. These include radar, electromagnetic detectors, X-ray photo58. Letter from J. William Lawder, General Attorney for United Air Lines, to Ronald
Fick, April 23, 1969.
59. Letter from Jennings N. Roberts, Acting Associate General Counsel for the Federal
Aviation Administration to Ronald Fick, May 6, 1969. Also under §901 of the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §1471 (1964), any person interfering with the flight crew or carrying
a weapon aboard the aircraft is subject to a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000 for each
such violation. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1969, at 77, col. 1.
60. See TME, Jan. 31, 1969, at 19; Washington Daily News, July 18, 1968, reprinted in
CONG. R e. §9385 (daily ed. July 25, 1968).
61. Washington Daily News, July 18, 1968, reprinted in CONG. REC. §9385

(daily ed.

July 25, 1968).
62. See Palm Beach Post, June 25, 1969, at 1; Dr. John Dailey, chief of the psychology
staff of the Federal Aviation Administration, has just finished a six-month study of hijackers.
Dailey said: "If you dig deeply enough, you find serious emotional instability in almost
every case." LrFE, April 18, 1969, at 26.
63. Letter, note 58 supra.
64. Letter from William R. Howard, Legal and Assistant Secretary for Eastern Airlines, to Ronald Fick, April 11, 1969.
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graphs, magnetometers, chemical "snifters" for analyzing the presence of
explosives from emitted vapors, and scintillation counters to detect cobalt-60
seeded in the explosives. 65 All proposed procedures for searching passengers
are being fully coordinated with the Department of Justice in an attempt to
avoid violating the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Recently the FAA announced a breakthrough in the
development of a screening device designed to detect weapons carried aboard
aircraft by passengers: "The device employes two aluminum pole sensors one on each side of an airplane boarding gate - connected to a graph recorder,
much like a physician's cardiograph." G6 The device is inconspicuous and has
proved remarkably sensitive in detecting and discriminating between weapons
and nonweapons of a metallic substance. Operation of the device appears
neither to delay passengers nor to worsen the already serious problem of
flight scheduling. The FAA is aware of the bodily dangers to travelers who
are repeatedly screened by such devices and thus it may be presumed adequate
safeguards are or will be taken to protect the health of such passengers. 67
While only one airline is now currently employing a detection device,
all of the major airlines may avail themselves of the right to refuse boarding
to a prospective passenger if he refuses to permit a search of his person or
baggage.6 s Tariffs, self-imposed standards approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), govern what an individual airline may or may not do. For
example, the conditions of contract between the passenger and the airline
are set forth in such tariffs.6 9 All of the airlines, however, do not have the

same tariffs and thus far only one airline has filed a tariff giving it the right
to scan passengers with a detection device.7 ° However, all of the airlines
have the right to refuse to carry any passenger who refuses to be searched.71
Tariff 6 (A) reads in part: "Carrier will refuse to transport or will remove
at any point, any passenger . . . who refuses to permit search of his person

or property for concealed, deadly or dangerous weapon." 7 2 Since this tariff
is only a few months old, there has been no litigation concerning its constitutionality7 3 An attendant legal question may arise with respect to the
65. Letter from Jennings N. Roberts, Acting Associate General Counsel for the Federal
Aviation Administration, to Ronald Fick, May 6, 1969. See LOOK, April 15, 1969, at 100
(Charles T. Art has trained two German Shepherds to "sniff" out bombs, plastic explosives,
dynamite, and gunpowder. The airlines are interested in using these dogs in airports).
66. Palm Beach Post, June 25, 1969, at 1.
67. See N.Y. Times, March 20, 1969, at 94, col. 5.
68. The letter from William R. Howard, note 64 supra, indicates that Eastern Airlines
is allowed to file a tariff permitting such searches; it can be assumed all airlines have such
a right if approved by the CAB; see Fla. H.R. 584 Reg. Sess. (1969), introduced but not
passed, providing authority for scheduled airlines to require persons to show that they do
not have in their possession any weapon, device, or thing that could be used to threaten
persons or endanger aircraft.
69. Letter, from William R. Howard, note 64 supra.
70. Id.
71. Tariff 6(A), C.T.C. (A) 44, CAB No. 117, (Oct. 27, 1968).
72. Id.
73. It may not meet the "reasonableness' test laid down by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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search of a passenger or his baggage if the search reveals something other
than a "hijacking tool," but which is nonetheless incriminating to the passenger. A like problem can arise with a detection device where the device is
registering, (indicating a possible weapon) but other incriminating evidence
is found. It is obvious with the frequency of hijackings74 that this seemingly
unlimited right to search is necessary. Airlines would do well to use it with
discretion. Before searching a person or his baggage, the airline official
should indicate that he had "good cause" for doing so or has a "reasonable
belief" that the passenger is carrying a weapon. One airline has indicated
that it feels it must have "reasonable grounds" for denying transportation
to a passenger.7 5 That same airline indicated that such reasonable grounds
would be a positive reading on the detection device, but warned that while
perhaps no legal action could be taken against the airline if a search proved
fruitless, "unnecessary detention or humiliation" by a search, unless entirely
justified, is not in the interest of the travelling public7 6
As an additional preventive measure it has been suggested that all hijackings could be stopped if the United States were to lift its ban on travel
to Cuba and allow people to travel freely between the two countries. The
situation overlooks several factors. First, there is no absolute travel ban
since authorizations for passports are granted to journalists, doctors, and some
students. Second, although it must be done circuitously, citizens of the
United States can fly to Havana via Mexico City. Finally, Cuba, rather than
the United States, ultimately controls whom it lets into its country. The
State Department has told the Cuban government that it is willing to fly
"homesick" Cubans back on the twice daily shuttle flights that bring refugees
from Cuba and usually return empty. The Cuban government has thus far
refused the offer77
C. Problems of Venue and Jurisdiction
One or more defendants alleged to have committed offenses aboard an
aircraft may be tried in the federal judicial district where either one or both
offenders is arrested or first brought.7 8 This makes possible "one trial in
one judicial district for two or more joint offenders who commit an offense
outside the United States, and the one judicial district may be where any
one or more of such joint offenders is arrested or is first brought into the
United States." 79 Moreover, prosecution may be initiated against such of74. As of April 18, 1969, fifty-one men have attempted a hijacking, and thirty-eight
have been successful since the first hijacking on May 1, 1961. LIFE, April 18, 1969, at 26.
See generally TIME, Jan. 31, 1969, at 20, which states that each hijacking costs an airline
about $8,500; U.S. NEws & WORL. REPORT, Feb. 24, 1969, at 36.
75. Letter from Sidney F. Davis, Assistant to General Counsel for Delta Air Lines, to
Ronald Fick, April 28, 1969.
76. Id.
77. CONG. Rac. S9385 (daily ed. July 25, 1968).
78. 49 U.S.C. §1473 (1964).
79. H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1961); see 49 U.S.C. §1473 (1964). See
generally 18 U.S.C. §3238 (1964); United Staws v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
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fenders, although they remain outside the United States, in the district of
their last known residence or if no such residence is known, in the District
of Columbia. s° This procedure avoids the possibility of obtaining immunity
through the running of the statute of limitations, without first proving such
offender is indeed a fugitive from justice.-s Finally, trial, inquiry, determination, and punishment are possible in "any jurisdiction in which offense was
begun, continued or completed, in the same manner as if the offense had been
'' actually and wholly committed therein."
Congress intended that the 1961 Amendment extend the jurisdiction of
the United States not only to American flag aircraft in flight in air commerce 3 over foreign countries, but also to foreign aircraft in flight in air
commerce over foreign countries provided that such flights originate at or
are destined to points within the United States. 4 Its broad application was
intended to be both within constitutional limits and in accord with the law
of nations and international agreements. 5
Criminal jurisdiction can be exercised by the United States under several
internationally recognized theories. 86 Jurisdiction, in this sense, refers to
crimes other than those that "strike at the very root of international society,"such as crimes of piracy, war crimes, and slavery. 87 Any country that obtains
lawful custody of an international criminal is competent to prosecute, convict,
80. 49 U.S.C. §1473 (1964).
81. See note 41 supra.
82. 49 U.S.C. §1501 (1964). Some difficulty, however, arises in establishing jurisdiction
"which may exist in the case of an offense committed in only one jurisdiction. In such
cases . . . the place where the crime was committed must still be determined in order to
assure a trial in the State or district in which the crime was committed." H.R. REP. No. 958,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1961).
83. 49 U.S.C. §1301 (4) (1964): "'Air Commerce' means interstate, overseas, or foreign
air commerce or the transportation of mail by aircraft or any operation or navigation of
aircraft within the limits of any Federal airway or any operation or navigation of aircraft
which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air
commerce."
84. See H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 4, 8 (1961) (Congress felt the extension
of such jurisdiction to foreign flights necessary because of the large number of American
citizens normally aboard.)
85. See H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961). Letter from Brooks Hays,
Assistant Secretary, Department of State, to Honorable Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of
the Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, Aug. 7, 1961. H.R. REP. No. 958, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 27, 28 (1961). Noted therein is the fact that such a broad extension of U.S. jurisdiction to foreign aircraft flying above a foreign country or the high seas might be considered
by the "foreign countries of registry to be an improper exercise of jurisdiction ... and give
rise to foreign relations difficulties." See also Boyle, InternationalAir Law, 39 OKLA. B.J. 711
(1968) (international air law as it is applied today is derived from international conventions and treaties most of which date from the late 1940's).
86. See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. SPECIAL Supp. 435 (1935).
87. Bridge, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation of International Criminal Law, 13 INT. & Comp. L.Q. 1255, 1262 (1964) (favoring a
series of international conventions to formulate international criminal law); see Colt, The
Necessity of an International Court of Criminal Justice, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 13 (1966) (favoring
a binding code of international criminal law).
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and punish him.18 ' Although the United States has specifically avoided drawing an analogy between aircraft piracy and piracy on the high seas, other
signators of the Convention on the High Seas might possibly obtain custody
and try aircraft hijackers as international criminals.8 9
The territorial principle of jurisdiction, under which jurisdiction is
determined according to the locus of the criminal act, is universally accepted
and has been significantly developed in modern times.90 Under this theory,
a country is competent to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all acts occurring
within its territory.91 "Territory" includes the airspace above a state's land
area, its internal waters and their beds, and its territorial sea and the bed
of the territorial sea. 92 The United States has expanded this principle to
include jurisdiction over persons initiating criminal acts within the United
States, but completing them abroad (the subjective territorial theory) ;93 and
to persons initiating criminal acts abroad but completing them within the
United States (the objective territorial theory) .9 International law is
incorporated into the municipal law of the United States.9 5 Thus, under the
territorial theory, although it is hardly suited for criminal acts aboard aircraft, 96 the United States can exercise jurisdiction over all persons who commit
criminal offenses aboard any nation's aircraft while such aircraft is within
the territory of the United States.
Ships and aircraft are not territory per se; nevertheless, it is recognized
"that a state has with respect to such ship or aircraft jurisdiction which is
88. See United States v. Holmei, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
UNrrED STATES §34 (1965); Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 86, at 564.
89. See Convention, note 38 supra, article 19: "On the high seas, or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a
ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the
property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon
the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard
to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith."
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF Ti

90. See Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 484.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw or THE UNITED STATES §17

91.

(1965).
92. See Yenkichi Ito v. United States, 64 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 762 (1933); Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968); RESTATEMENT, note 91
supra, §11; Harvard Research in International Law, note 86 supra.

Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986
see Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 86, at 484; REsrATEMENT,
supra, §17.
Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, Groleau v.
States, 38 U.S. 884 (1967); see United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968);
REsTATEMENT, note 91 supra, §18; Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 86,
at 488.
95. Hilton v. Guyat, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
93.
(1967);
note 91
94.
United

96.

See Brown, Jurisdiction of United States Courts Over Crimes in Aircraft, 15 STAN.

L. REv. 45, 46 (1962). "The speed of contemporary aircraft and the ease of flight across
the boundaries of national states, however, render territoriality in itself impractical and
inadequate, especially in areas of the world where national states are relatively small in lani
area."
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similar" to that which it exercises over its territory.97 A federal district court
in United States v. Cordova9" stated it had: "[L]ittle doubt that had it wished
to do so Congress could, under its police power, have extended federal
criminal jurisdiction to acts committed on board an airplane owned by an
American national, even though such acts had no effect upon national
security." 99 To this end, under the 1961 Amendment, jurisdiction over
crimes committed on board American registered aircraft in flight falls within
the jurisdiction of the United States.10 0 Prior to the 1961 Amendment, the
"law of the flag" doctrine was extended to American aircraft by way of the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.'0 1 Such
jurisdiction was presumed not to apply while the aircraft was in flight over
the land area of another country 02 However, under the 1961 Amendment
this is not the case; the United States has jurisdiction over all on-board offenses even though committed while the aircraft is in the territory of another
country 0 3
The 1963 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircrafto4 seeks to achieve worldwide uniformity of air law.105

97. See United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820); Harvard Research in
InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 509.
98. 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).
99. Id. at 302.
100. See RESTATEMENT, note 91 supra, §§31, 32. See generally 49 U.S.C. §1301 (5) (1964).
"'Aircraft' means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for
navigation of or flight in the air."
101. 18 U.S.C. §7 (1964). "The term 'special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of
the United States,' as used in this title includes ....
(5) Any aircraft belonging in whole
or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or
under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district or possession thereof,
while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of
any particular State." (The statute was amended July 12, 1952, ch. 695, 66 Stat. 589, to
read as above to include "aircraft," in a response to United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp.
298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), which refused jurisdiction of an offense committed aboard an
American aircraft flying above the high seas.) See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94
(1922); Wynne v. United States, 217 U.S. 234 (1910) (Court interpreted the phrase "out of
the jurisdiction of any particular State" to refer to one of the states of the United States
and not to a foreign country). See generally United States v. State of La.,... U.S.... 89
S. Ct. 773 (1969) (the high seas are not subject to the dominion of any single nation).
102. See Brown, note 96 supra. See also United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933);
United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76 (1820); Nixon v. United States, 352 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1965); Letter from
Brooks Hays, note 85 supra.
103. See RESTATEMENT, note 91 supra, §31.
104. Signed at Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., Sept. 25, 1968. In a message to member airlines of the International Air Transport
Association, IATA Director General Knut Hammarskjold called for immediate ratification
of the Tokyo Convention by governments. He stressed the need for immediate implementation of article II, Int'l Air Transport Ass'n News, Jan. 13, 1969. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14,
1969, at 77, col. 5; Feb. 22, 1969, at 58, col. 8; Feb. 25, 1969, at 3, col. 5; Feb. 27, 1969, at
40, col. 3. See also Boyle, Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed in Flight; An International
Convention, 3 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 68 (1965); Pulsifer & Boyle, The Tokyo Convention on
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"The Convention establishes as a positive rule of international law that the
State in which an aircraft is registered is competent to exercise jurisdiction
over offenses committed aboard that aircraft when it is in flight, or on the
surface of the high seas or any other area outside the territory of any state." 106
The United States maintains that the Convention merely gives international
recognition to this preexisting theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 1 0 7 Moreover, the Convention proposes no priority governing the order by which
countries claiming concurrent jurisdiction settle the dispute; instead resolution of this problem is left to application of extradition treaties. 08 The
Convention further authorizes the aircraft commander to use certain measures
in coping with criminal acts on board the aircraft; 0 9 it enumerates the
responsibilities of the contracting states in receiving those allegedly guilty of
committing unlawful acts on board the aircraft,10 and, finally, it provides
specifically for the unlawful seizure of aircraft::""
(1) When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force
or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful
exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about
to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures
to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve
his control of the aircraft.
(2) In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the
Contracting State in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers
and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable, and shall
return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to
possession.

Offenses and Certain Other Acts on Board Aircraft, 30 J. Am. L. & CoM. 305 (1964). But
see Gutienez, Should the Tokyo Convention of 1963 Be Ratified?, 31 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 1
(1965).
105. See also Bayitch, Unification of Aviation Law in the Western Hemisphere, 19
U. MIAMI L. Rxv. 535 (1965).
106. Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State of the United States to the President
of the United States, Sept. 6, 1968, as reported in The Message from the President of the

United States transmitting "The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft." S. Executive Letter, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., (1968); Tokyo Convention,
note 104 supra, ch. XII -Jurisdiction, art. 3 (1).
107. Pulsifer & Boyle, supra note 104, at 334.
108. Boyle, supra note 104, at 72-73; Tokyo Convention note 104 supra, ch. XI-Juris-

diction, art. 3 (3); a recent concurrent resolution in the Senate indicated that while the
adoption of the Tokyo Convention by the United States would be a step in the right direction, it will still be inadequate to cope with the problem successfully. That resolution
recommended that the Administration strengthen the Tokyo Convention by adding clauses
that: "call for the automatic extradition of all hijackers to the flag country of the hijacked aircraft, and the immediate release of hijacked aircraft, together with their crews
and passengers; and (ii) make it mandatory for the signatory nations to terminate bilateral
air transport arrangements with any country that refuses to become a party to the new
international convention on hijackings." S. Con. Res. 7, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See

also RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, at 104.
109. Tokyo Convention, note 104 supra, ch. III- Powers of the Aircraft Commander.
110. Id. Chapter V-Powers and Duties of States.
111. Id. Chapter IV- Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, art. 11.
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Article II was included in the Convention upon the suggestion of the United
States. It was felt that the piracy provision of the Convention on the High
Seas 1 2 was too limited in its application to deal successfully with the type of
aircraft piracy presently plaguing the United States." 3 Like the 1961 Amendment, the Tokyo Convention does not describe the unlawful seizure or
attempt to seize aircraft in terms analogous to that of the international crime
of piracy. 1 4 Instead, the legality of the seizure is to be determined by the
law of the state in which the aircraft is registered or by the law of the
country over which the seizure occurs. Undoubtedly, the seizure of American
aircraft, pursuant to the "aircraft piracy" statutes would be unlawful, thus
implementing article II.1 5 What makes article II of limited use under the
normal hijacking situation involving American aircraft and Cuba is that
even if the latter were a signatory to the convention, under article 13 Cuba
would have the prerogative to determine whether the hijacker should or
6
should not be held in custody to await prosecution or extradition."
The United States has long recognized that it has jurisdiction over its
own nationals anywhere in the world. 117 Thus, it would appear that the
1961 Amendment extends the jurisdiction of the United States to all unlawful
acts committed by its nationals on board foreign aircraft above international
waters or the land area of a foreign country.""
The "universal" principle of jurisdiction is determined with reference
to the custody of the offender. 19 It is a subsidiary source of jurisdiction and
predicated upon the refusal to accept surrender of the offender by the country
112. See note 38 supra.
113. The aircraft piracy provision of the Convention on the High Seas would apply
only in situations when the aircraft was above the high seas and not within a sovereiga's
airspace. Further, "acts committed by the crew or passenger against person or property on
the same aircraft would appear to be excluded." Pulsifer & Boyle, supra note 104, at 325.
114. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has asked its member airlines to urge their respective governments to petition the United Nations to declare hijacking an international crime similar to piracy on the high seas and genocide, and to take
further action designed to reveal the facts as to each incident and to provide for the
punishment of the criminal. The Air Transport Association has made the same request
of the United States (statement by Stuart G. Tipton, President, Air Transport Association
of America, before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Feb. 6, 1969
(unpublished)), See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1969, at 85, col. 5.
115. See note 14 supra.
116. See note 104 supra. Tokyo Convention, article 13 (2): "Upon being satisfied that
the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State shall take custody or other measures
to ensure the presence of any person suspected of an act contemplated in art. 11, I1, and
of any person of whom it has taken delivery. The custody and other measures shall be as
provided in the law of that State but may only be continued for such time as is reasonably
necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted."
117. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); The Appallon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
362 (1824); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820); see Harvard Research
in International Law, supra note 86, at 519 (the offense of treason is most illustrative of
national jurisdiction); RESTATEMENT, note 91 supra §30. See generally United States v.
Chandler, 72 F. Supp. 230 (D.D. Mass. 1947).
118. But cf. United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412 (1820).
119. See Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 86, at 545, 574.
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in whose territory the crime was committed. Under this principle, jurisdiction
of the United States can arguably be extended pursuant to the 1961 Amendment to aliens who commit offenses on board foreign aircraft over international water or the territory of another country. 20 Such jurisdiction is
essentially exercised to prevent impunity; and its application is most restrictive,
12
giving recognition to the superior authority of the territorial principle. 1
The United States has a legitimate interest in protecting foreign commerce.122 However, the Supreme Court, in a civil case'

23

concerning injury

occurring to a foreign seaman on board a foreign vessel anchored in a foreign
2
harbor, stated: 4
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided;
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as
strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an American
transaction.
Contact resulting from foreign commerce is not recognized as a basis for
exerting extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. The court's reasoning in the
civil context is applicable to criminal cases as well.
The main purpose of enacting the 1961 Amendment was the protection
of American passengers flying at home and abroad. To this end, Congress
intended federal jurisdiction to extend to criminal acts on board foreign aircraft flying outside the territory of the United States, so long as the flight
was to terminate or had originated in the United States. 25 The passive
personality theory determines jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of
the person injured by the offense.1 26 All those aboard a hijacked plane are
victimized to some extent by the unlawful act. Although the United States
has previously not relied upon the passive personality theory, it is apparent
Congress sought its application by the broad coverage of the 1961 Amendment. 27 Jurisdiction would thus extend to offenses committed against
American passengers regardless of the nationality of the offender, the aircraft,
or the territory above which they travel.
Similar to the above theory, the protective theory determines jurisdiction
120. See RESTATEMErNT, supra note 91, at 97. The Restatement apparently restricts the
principle of universality to those offenses of universal interest. Although air piracy, under
American law, is not described in terms of an international crime, nevertheless, it is of such
universal interest it probably would be interpreted to fall within the scope of the universal
theory.
121. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820); Harvard Research
in InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 572.
122. See United States v. Braverman, 376 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389

U.S. 885 (1967).
123. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
124. Id. at 582.
125. See note 84 supra.
126. See HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 445, 479.
127. See RESrATEMENT, note 91 supra, §30 (2).
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by reference to the national interest injured by the offense. 128 Under this
theory, the United States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses that
129
"interfere with the functioning of its public agencies and instrumentalities."'
The United States has made little use of this theory, and its application in
130
the realm of aircraft hijacking appears most limited.
The basic postulate that an "act of Congress ought never to be construed
31
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains"'
permeates this entire field. Pursuant to the internationally recognized principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the 1961 Amendment can be as farreaching as its plain words purport so long as it does not offend the law of
nations. The fact that concurrent jurisdiction would at times exist with
other countries is not determinative.

13 2

Conclusion
The solution to the hijacking problem is academic - simply arrest, convict, and sentence offenders and the menace to air travel will disappear.
Problems of personal jurisdiction, however, frustrate efforts to apply criminal
sanctions, thus necessitating development of procedures to apprehend potential hijackers before they have a chance to board an aircraft.
PART 1I: CIVIL LAW AsPEcrs

Aircraft hijacking is disappointing in a sense for one interested in the
civil law implications of this psycho-political phenomenon. At first glance the
area would seem fertile for civil litigation. One thinks first of the businessman
who loses a contract or client because of the delay involved in an unanticipated and unwanted excursion to Cuba. There may be perishable goods
aboard and the unannounced detour may mean their ruin. Passengers or
personnel of the airline may attempt to capture the hijacker, and someone may
be injured or killed. Mental anguish may be suffered or a mental disorder
may be inflicted as a result of the incident.
Several practical factors militate against litigation resulting from these
factual settings. A suit against the hijacker, while legally meritorious, would
probably be futile from the standpoint of one wishing monetary redress.
Thus, the hijacker is eliminated from the list of potential defendants. If the
plaintiff is tortiously injured by a passenger in the course of the hijacking,
although this is unlikely, there is a more realistic hope of obtaining adequate
compensation. Resulting legal action would differ from that ensuing from
a similar act occurring on the ground only in that cumbersome conflict and
128. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Chandler, 72
F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1947); RESTATEMENT, note 91 supra, §33; Harvard Research in
InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 543.
129. HarvardResearch in InternationalLaw, supra note 86, at 544.
130. See RESTATEMENT, note 91 supra, §33.
131. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953).
132. Accord, United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249 (1893); see RESTTEmENT note 91
supra, §40.
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choice-of-law problems may be present. If employees of the airline are injured
by acts attributable to the airline's negligence, the airline's liability is uniformly governed by workmen's compensation statutes. 133 It has been suggested
that airline employees should be joined as defendants only if federal jurisdiction is sought to be avoided, since their presence in a suit eliminates an
important sympathy factor favoring the plaintiff. 3 4 Thus, passengers and
shippers are most likely to be cast as plaintiffs and airlines as defendants, the
latter because of their virtually unlimited assets and impersonal countenance.
For this reason discussion will focus on the legal problems inherent in a suit
involving these parties and stemming from aircraft hijacking.
A.

Conflicts and Choice-of-Law Problems

Consideration of the issues involved in determining liability of airlines
and their employees to passengers almost necessarily includes the area of
conflict of laws. If the flight is purely intrastate and there is no diversity
of citizenship between the litigants, there will be no conflict-of-laws problem.135 Yet this must surely be the exceptional case in airline flights in
general, and the coincidence of these conditions is rare in flights where hijacking usually takes place. Thus, if the state where the wrongful act takes
place differs from the state where the action is brought, and the action is commenced in a state court, matters of procedure may be governed by the law of
the forum state, and the substantive law applied will be that of the place of
wrong, 36 the place having the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties, 3 7 or perhaps a jurisdiction determined in yet another
manner. 13s A contractual action may be governed by the substantive law of
the state where it is made, 39 where it is to be performed, 4 0 where there is
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties,' 4 ' or
possibly the law of a place determined by other criteria.14 2 Unfortunately,
from the standpoint of uniformity, states do not always agree on what is to
be termed procedural or substantive. 143
133. 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW §3.14 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
KREINDLER].
134. 2 KREINDLER, note 133 supra, §25.01 [10]. The author suggests, in §25.01 (1), that
a Warsaw Convention case would present an entirely different situation. See text accompanying notes 162-178.
135. See 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1964); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806);
C. WRIGHT, FEER-AL COURTS §24 (1963).
136. REsrATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§377-83 (1934); R. LaFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAw §132 (1968).
137. R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §145 (Proposed Final Draft 1968);
R. LEFLAR, note 136 supra, §§135, 136, 138, 141.
138. R. LEFLAR, note 136 supra, §134.
139. RrSTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§312-31 (1934); R. LELAR, note 136 supra,

§§144, 145.
140.
141.
142.
143.

R. LEFLAR, note 136 supra, §145.
RESTATEMENT, note 137 supra, §188; R. LEF.FLAR, note 136 supra, §§146, 149.
R. LEFLAR, note 136 supra, §§146, 149.
1 KREINDLER, note 133 supra, §2.01.
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If suits arising out of aircraft hijacking follow the course of general
aviation accident litigation they will be brought in federal courts on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. 144 The court must decide in a diversity action
whether a particular matter is substantive or procedural under the aegis of
Erie R. R. v. Tompkins145 and its progeny. 146 If the matter is procedural,
federal rules govern; if substantive, the court must look to the law of the
forum state.14' In order to determine whether a subject is procedural or
substantive, the court must determine whether it is likely substantially to
5
affect the outcome of the litigation.S'
Whether a matter is termed procedural
or substantive by the forum state is irrelevant; if it is found likely to determine
the outcome of the litigation, the law of the forum state, including its con49
flict of laws rules, will be applied.
Interest in the area should not be wholly academic. The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur may create a presumption of negligence in the state where
the damage took place, but may only give rise to a permissible inference of
negligence in the forum state. 50 Since the doctrine may have a material
effect on substantive rights or substantially affect the outcome of the case, 51
the plaintiff will obviously be interested in the argument that the matter is
procedural under the forum state's conflicts law. If the statute of limitations
of the state where the harm occurred has run in a wrongful death action but
the statute in the forum state would allow the suit, a determination of the
conflict of laws question settles whether a suit may be brought in the first
52
instance .
Choice-of-law problems may enter if the harm occurs on or over navigable
waters or the high seas. If the airline involved is an American carrier and
personal injury is sustained, determination of applicable law must be made
on the basis of existing maritime law since there are no cases in an aviation
setting. 15 3 Depending on the jurisdiction, this may be the law of the state
of incorporation of the aircraft's owner, the place where the contract of
carriage was made, the general law of admiralty, or the law specified in a
provision of the ticket."5 If death of a passenger results from the wrong,
144. 1 KREINDLER, note 133 supra, §2.02[1].
145. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
146. E.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS §§55-59 (1963).
147. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
148. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
149. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
650 (1940).
150. See, e.g., Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951).
151. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
152. See, e.g., Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 259 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1958); Nelson
v. Eckert, 231 Ark. 348, 329 S.W.2d 426 (1959).
153. 1 KREINDLER note 133 supra, §2.10[l][a].
154. Id. See Horton v. J. & J. Aircraft, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 120 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Notarian
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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admiralty has jurisdiction over the matter. 155 If death is caused by wrongful
conduct more than a marine league from shore, the Death on the High Seas
Act 5 6 must supply the remedy, since there could be no recovery under common law. 57 If the incident occurs within a marine league from the shore
but above navigable waters, admiralty still has jurisdiction over the subject
matter but the state wrongful death statute will supply the remedy.15 If
the airline involved is a foreign carrier and personal injuries occur over the
high seas, the law of the place where the aircraft is registered would probably
be applied. 159 If death results, admiralty will still have jurisdiction and the
Death on the High Seas Act will again supply the remedy.1 60 However, cases
are not in agreement as to whether the Death on the High Seas Act supplies
a right of action in itself when a foreign carrier is involved, or whether the
law of the state of the foreign carrier is the sole source of remedial law.' 6 '
The issue could be of crucial importance if a right of action did not exist
under the law of the carrier's country or if that law left the plaintiff with
an inadequate remedy.
B. InternationalAgreements
International treaties such as the Warsaw Convention' 62 may be of consequence in an aircraft hijacking situation. Most countries adhere to the
Convention,163 which creates a presumption of liability on the part of the
airlines in international flights- but limits the amount of damages for personal injuj-ies or wrongful death to approximately 8,300 dollars. 165 International travel is defined rather inclusively, and it is possible for the convention
M

155. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d. Cir. 1963); 46 U.S.C. §761
(1964).
156. 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1964).
157. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963).
158. Id.
159. 1 KPMNDLER note 133 supra, §2.10[2][a]. The author expresses the following caveat:
"It is well to remember, however, that, with respect to accidents occurring on foreign ships,
or in foreign countries, there is no constitutional requirement that the court give full
faith and credit to the foreign law. Thus, particularly where citizens of its own state are
concerned, courts may be less likely to enforce alien principles."
160. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963); Jennings v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp., 227 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1964). Contra, Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.; 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
161. See Noel v. Linel Aeropostal Venezolana, 260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Noel
v. Airponents, 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J. 1958). Contra, Bergeron v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch
Airlines, 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
162. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 624 (1935).
163. See 1 KRENDLER note 133 supra, §10.013] for a listing of these countries.
164. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, arts. 17, 20, 21, 49 Stat. 628 (1935). The carrier will
not be liable if all precautionary measures are taken, and contributory negligence on the
part of the injured party may partially or wholly exonerate the carrier. Id., arts. 20, 21.
165. Id. art. 22.
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to limit recovery on a purely domestic flight.16 6 On a tour to South America
a New Yorker whose first flight is to stop in Miami would be in international
travel if the country of destination is a signatory of the convention'6 The
Hague Protocol, which doubles the limits of liability and has been signed
but not ratified by the United States, is adhered to by most Convention
signatories.16
A recent development that mitigates against the harshness of the Warsaw
Convention and the Hague Protocol is the Montreal Agreement. 169 This
arrangement, in which major foreign and domestic airlines concur, 170 provides
for a limit of liability to each passenger for "death, wounding, or other bodily
injury of $75,000 inclusive of legal fees, and, in case of a claim brought in
a State where provision is made for separate award of legal fees and costs,
a limit of $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs."' 71 The liability of the
airlines is absolute unless contributory negligence, which may lessen or bar
recovery, or lack of causation in fact can be affirmatively proved.' 72 As under
the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, willful misconduct on the
part of the airlines will open the door to unlimited recovery. 173 The agreement encompasses all international flights, as defined in the Convention
or the Convention as amended by the protocol, in which the United States
is included as a point of origin, point of destination, or scheduled stopping
place.174 Thus, recovery for personal injury or death arising from an incident
of aircraft hijacking would be quite likely if the misfortune occurred on an
international flight covered by the Agreement.
The Montreal Agreement unfortunately does not affect recovery for damages from loss of property, and thus the Warsaw Convention governs. Essentially, its thrust is to limit recovery for the loss of property to 331.67 dollars
for twenty kilograms of checked baggage.', 5 A greater evaluation may be
declared but the airline may ask compensation for the increased liability.
Article 20 of the Convention absolves the carrier from liability if all
necessary measures to avoid the damage have been taken and further provides
that the carrier should not be liable "if he proves that the damage was
occasioned by an error in piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navi-

166.

Id. art. 1; see 1

KREINDLER

note 133 supra, §1.05[1]

167. See I KRFINDLER note 133 supra, §11.05[l].
168.

Id. §§12.01-.03.

169. The Montreal Agreement is set forth in I KREINDLER note 133 supra, §12A.03
(Supp. 1968). It was developed in Montreal on May 4, 1966, between representatives of
the State Department of the United States, Civil Aeronautics Board, International Air
Transport Association, and airline representatives.
170. Set forth in I KREINDLER note 133 supra, §12A.03 (Supp. 1968).
171. C.A.B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
172. Id.
173. See 1 KREINDLER note 133 supra, §12A.07 (Supp. 1968).
174. This provision is found in the tariff to be filed under the terms of the Agreement. It is set forth in 1 KREINDLER note 133 supra, §12A.04 (Supp. 1968).
175. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 22, 49 Stat. 629 (1935); 1 KREINDLER note 133
supra, §11.03[2].
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gation and that, in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage." 176 As in the case of personal injury under
7
the convention, there is a presumption of liability on the part of the airline" 7
78
and willful misconduct will remove the ceiling on recovery.
C.

Carrier Liability

Principles governing liability of carriers by other means are generally
applicable to aircarriers, subject to certain distinctions. 79 Aircarriers have
been defined as citizens of the United States who undertake directly or
indirectly by any agreement to engage in air transportation.8s Such carriers
are classified as common or private, and a determination of the category
into which the carrier falls may be important in deciding the standard of
care or the application of legal principles such as res ipsa loquitur.81 Several
82
factors must be considered:
A carrier is a common carrier if it holds itself out to the public as
willing to carry all passengers for hire indiscriminately. . . . The
key question is whether it holds itself out, either expressly or by
course of conduct, to carry for hire on a uniform tariff all persons
applying, subject to existing capacity. The distinctive characteristic
of a common carrier is that it undertakes as a business to carry the
general public. The private carrier does not hold itself out to the
public as ready to accept and carry all who offer. The private or
contract carrier may refuse to contract for carriage.
The duty of common carrier airlines to their paying passengers is defined
by state law and modified by standards imposed by federal legislation and
administrative orders. Existing federal laws do not preclude exercise of the
sovereign powers of the states,8 3 and thus most states hold a common
carrier airline to "the highest degree of care" to its paying passengers, although
some states, such as New York, are abandoning this standard in favor of a
standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. 8 4 New York's standard
of care is similar if not identical to that which private carriers owe their

176. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, art. 20 (2), 49 Stat. 610, 629 (1935).
177. Id. art. 22.
178. Id. art. 25; 1 KRMNDLER note 133 supra, §11.04.
179. 8 Am. JuR. 2d Aviation §37 (1963).
180. Id.
181. 1 KPMNDLER note 133 supra, §3.01.
182. 1 KxmNDERn note 133 supra, §3.01. See 49 U.S.C. §1374(b) for standards
plicable to common air carriers as to discrimination, stating that no person shall be
jected to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudices or
advantages in any respect whatsoever. See also Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

apsubdis200

F. Supp. 360 (SD. Cal. 1961).
183. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347
U.S. 590, 597 (1954).
184. 1 KRJEINDLER note 133 supra, §3.07.
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passengers. s5 However, all jurisdictions rule that carriers are not insurers
of the safety of their passengers. 8 6
This standard of care may be applied in a variety of places and circumstances, as where the safety of a passenger is threatened by another passenger.
A common carrier is bound to exercise the highest or utmost care in this
respect. 8 7 However, the rule that the airline is not an insurer of the safety

of its passengers applies and the carrier "will not be held liable for injuries
to passengers caused by the improper conduct of fellow passengers, unless
the carrier has notice, or in the exercise of proper care should have notice,
of such conduct, and reason to anticipate that injury may result therefrom."'' 8
It should be noted that the employees of a carrier have the powers of police
officers for protecting passengers from assault by fellow passengers, and the
carrier has the duty to provide ready help to protect passengers against assaults "from such sources and under such conditions as might reasonably be
8 9
expected to place the carrier on notice.'
There are no reported cases dealing with assault or injury by violent
acts of a fellow airline passenger, but since the rules regarding carriers in
general are applicable to airlines, Miller v. Mills 9 may offer some insight
into the law that would be applicable were a hijacker to threaten the safety
of passengers. This case involved an altercation between a bus driver and
two intoxicated passengers who attempted to interfere with the progress of
the vehicle. A young passenger was injured by a hurled whiskey bottle. In
affirming a lower court decision finding liability on the part of the driver,
the court noted that it might have been reasonably anticipated that objects
would be thrown or even firearms discharged; thus the driver breached the
duty to exercise the highest degree of practicable care in protecting and
guarding passengers from violence and assault from whatever source might be
reasonably anticipated under the circumstances of the case and the condition
of the parties.191 The case indicates that the bus driver should not have used
force against the tort-feasor. Presumably airlines would be held liable for
92
like conduct on the part of their personnel in a hijacking situation.
Assuming that an airline met its duty of care and a passenger was nevertheless injured by violent acts of a hijacker, liability based on contract may
seem to offer a remedy. It is "well recognized that a ticket constitutes a
contract of carriage, and that implied in this contract is the carrier's obligation to safely transport the passenger.' 193 Such a basis of recovery might also
be considered if the state where the contract of carriage is made offers
185. Id. See, e.g., Grain Dealers Nat'l Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 190 F.2d 726,
729 (5th Cir. 1951).
186. 1 KREINDLER note 133 supra, §3.07.
187. 14 Am.JuR. 2d Carriers§1065 (1964).
188. Id.
189. Id., §1067.
190. 257 S.W.2d 520 (Ct. App. Ky. 1953).
191. Id. at 522.
192. Bradford, The Legal Ramifications of Hijaching Airplanes, 48 A.B.A.J.
1036 (1962).
193. 1 KREINDLER note 133 supra, §3.02.
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unlimited liability for wrongful death and the conflict law of the forum state
requires application of a state wrongful death statute restricting compensation.194 However, there is solid precedent to support the proposition that an
airline's tort liability cannot be enlarged by suing for breach of its agreement
to transport passengers safely, and that actions based on contract will not
survive the decedent. 195 Although two causes of action may be pleaded, if the
"gravamen of the cause of action is an alleged breach of a duty through
negligence, the action is governed by the applicable law of torts, even though
the allegations refer to a breach of a contract."'' 96 Thus, a bar to recovery in
197
tort may very well influence the result of an action in contract.
A passenger injured by the conduct of a hijacker may perhaps recover
for breach of warranty, although only one reported case has suggested
recovery against an airline (as distinguished from a manufacturer or seller)
on such a basis in an aviation situation.'98 It is arguable that airlines are
under a duty to furnish an airworthy ship and a competent crew, just as
the owner of a vessel is -under a like obligation to furnish a seaworthy ship
and a competent crew. 9 9 The implied warranty of seaworthiness is an
20
absolute, nondelegable duty independent of negligence.
It has been suggested that implied warranty of airworthiness may have a
future in aviation law, 20 and Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc. 202 explicitly
recognizes such a remedy although in stating that "[tihe aircraft ... was not
airworthy, in that her co-pilot was incompetent within the knowledge and
privity of respondent" the court apparently qualified the absolute liability
that would result from transferring principles of seaworthiness to aviation.203
Several additional factors indicate that adoption of an implied warranty
of airworthiness will not simply be an adoption of admiralty principles to
aircraft. Admiralty limits the doctrine of unseaworthiness to seamen or those

194. It should be noted that New York will not apply a limitation on wrongful death
recovery of another state if the action is brought in New York state courts. Kilbert v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
195. Maynard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949); Ness v. West
Coast Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1965); Salamon v. Konomblijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.y., 198 Misc. 780, 100 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
196. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
197.

See Clancey, Fatalities in Aircraft Crashes-A Contractual Basis for Recovery,

27 J. Am L. & COMM. 262-67 (1960), for a critical analysis of this rule as applied in
wrongful death cases.
198. Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 268
F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959). See Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), for interesting cases on the relationship
of warranty and the Death on the High Seas Act; Jennings v. Goodyear Aircraft Corp.,
227 F. Supp. 246 (D. Del. 1964).
199. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw oF ADMIRALTY §§6-39 to -41 (1957).
200. Id. §§6-42 to -44.
201. 1 KRMDLER note 133 supra, §803.
202. 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), affd, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

361 U.S. 885 (1959).
203.

Id. at 131.
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performing the work of seamen. 20 4 Such a limitation has yet to be suggested
in aviation law. Also, a seaworthiness action does not survive the death
of the victim,205 but the fact that the aviation case first mentioning air-

worthiness involved a suit by the passenger's estate hints that this limitation
may not be transferred.206 Thus, the field is open for development but it is
difficult to predict how it will take shape.
It has been observed above that a plaintiff may not enlarge the liability
of an airline through a suit in contract. Conversely, it is sometimes stated
that an airline may not limit its tort liability through contract:20 7
It is a basic principle of law that one cannot in advance of doing an
act of negligence, limit his or its liability for the results which flow
from the tort of negligence . . . nor prescribe conditions for recovery

of damages which flow from acts of negligence, even though there
be a contract of carriage by a common carrier.
While this may be true as to the substantive aspects of tort liability for personal injuries, such statements, even theoretically valid, are misleading when
applied to other areas of airline liability.
Pursuant to federal legislation,208 airlines are permitted to file tariffs
with the Civil Aeronautics Board, which when approved by the Board constitute part of the contract for carriage of property or baggage.2 0 9 These
tariffs may set limits on liability for occurrences as diverse as loss of jewelry210
and failure to operate a flight according to schedule. 2 1 , Tariffs properly
filed and approved are binding on passengers and shippers regardless of lack
of knowledge or assent. 212 The limitation is effective regardless of whether
the action is founded in negligence, contract, or conversion.13 In the absence
of applicable statutes and rules and tariffs approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, common law rules of liability of carriers obtain.214 However, the
common law gives way to the broad regulatory scheme under federal law
governing the contract of the parties when they conflict 215 for "the primary

204.
205.
206.
F.2d 400
207.

G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§6-39 to -41.
Id. §6-51.
Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 268
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
Bernard v. United States Aircoach, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 138-39 (S.D. Cal. 1953).

208. 49 U.S.C. §1373 (1964).
209. Lichter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); see Twentieth
Century Delivery Serv., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire 9: Marine Ins. Co., 242 F.2d 292 (9th Cir.

1957).
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purpose of the Civil Aeronautics Act is to assure uniformity of rates and
services to all persons using the facilities of air carriers." 21"
Tariffs, rules, and regulations approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board
and "practices" of airlines are subject to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 217 As stated in Adler v. Chicago & Southern Airlines,2 18 the doctrine:
[P]rovides, in effect, that when Congress has created an administrative
commission, board or other agency with jurisdiction over and power to
regulate some particular field of endeavor, the courts, both state and
federal, are without jurisdiction or power to grant relief to any person
complaining of any act done or omitted to have been done, if the act
or omission is of such a nature as to be within the sphere of regulation
of the administrative agency involved, until such time as the person
complaining has exhausted his remedies before such administrative
body.
Hence, for example, damage resulting from delay in reaching a destination,
even though caused by the airline's "negligence," will not be compensable
because the airline's duty is defined in the tariff, which exempts it from
liability in this situation.219 Since there is no breach of duty there is no
negligence; and the reasonableness of the tariff's duty as outside the scope of
the governing statute may only be challenged before the Civil Aeronautics
22
Board,2 20 although there has been argument to the contrary. '
Thus, hopes of obtaining full compensation for loss of goods or baggage
due to hijacking will almost certainly be frustrated by applicable tariffs filed
by the airline, and recovery for such items as delay and spoilage may be
frustrated completely. 22 The passenger or the shipper on airlines frequently
subject to the hijacking phenomenon should be attentive of this and obtain
adequate insurance coverage.
Conclusion
Passengers and carriers may find dashed their early hopes of recovering
from the airline any adequate compensation resulting from aircraft hijacking.
State statutes or international agreements may prevent full recovery for personal injuries or death even though ultimate liability is found on the part
of the defendant. If the injured party is traveling on a flight beginning in
New York and ending in Miami it will be of little solace to find that
although he will not in all probability be able to recover damages if there
216. Lichter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
217. Herman v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 850 U.S.
843 (1955); Lichter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Adler v. Chicago
& S. Airlines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 336 (D. Mo. 1941).
218. 41 F. Supp. 366 (D. Mo. 1941).
219. Wittenberg v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 459, 460 (E.D.S.C. 1954); 1
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is no negligence involved, another passenger so injured on his way to the
Bahamas may be compensated up to 75,000 dollars inclusive of legal fees.2 2 3
If both are businessmen, neither will be able to obtain compensation for an
opportunity missed by the delay, even though an airline employee may have
22 4
promised otherwise.
There can be no justification for some of these incongruous results.
Limitations on recovery in state wrongful death statutes are generally
indefensible225 and their elimination would do much to diminish unnecessary
litigation in the conflict of laws area. The limitations on recovery of the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol are reminiscent of the outlook
of a certain Dickensian character, even considering their presumptions of
liability. But the Montreal Agreement's damage limitation is more supportable as a quid pro quo for absolute liability. Limitations established by
tariffs, while perhaps imposing an untoward result in a particular situation,
serve the essential purpose of creating uniformity, certainty, and lower rates
in an industry where such is highly desirable. The availability of insurance
serves to reduce the need for change in the field, at least in part, by providing
adequate compensation to passengers and shippers for problems they might
experience on a given flight. This has been accomplished in the area of the
Montreal Agreement's applicability by its requirement of a comprehensible
notice to be given to each passenger advising of the limitation of liability
and the availability of insurance not affected by the limitation.226 Similar
steps should be taken in other areas where airline customers are not given
realistic notice of restrictions on full compensation for losses, whether the
losses be occasioned by hijacking or some other misfortune.
RONALD L. FIcK
JON I. GORDON
JOHN C. PATTERSON
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